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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION’S COLORBLIND PROTECTION OF CROSS BURNING IN FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE LEGITIMATES WHITE SUPREMACY  
 
Kiran Sidhu* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion that the Supreme Court has used, and continues to 
use, the Constitution as an instrument to uphold White supremacy since 
the inception of our nation is hardly a novel concept.1 The Court’s use 
of colorblindness2 as a mechanism to maintain White racial privilege by 
creating legal frameworks that make it increasingly difficult to prevent, 
proscribe, or prosecute race-based violence is increasingly interrogated 
and exposed.3 Indeed, it is through the Court’s treatment of race-based 
claims in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause cases that we 
can most clearly see the employment of colorblindness as a vehicle to 
preserve the status quo.4 But, the idea that the Court has long taken a 
colorblind approach to constructing the contours of the First 
Amendment—highlighted by its laissez-faire attitude towards certain 
                                                 
* Kiran Sidhu, JD, LLM is an attorney fellow at Bay Area Legal Aid supporting 
Project Legal Link. The author thanks Professor Osagie K. Obasogie for cultivating 
the space to think critically about Constitutional Law and for encouraging her radical 
ideas. She also thanks David G. Carlisle, esq., whose analytical brain and 
commitment to advancing racial justice, meant his enthusiasm and accord for the 
ideas contained in this piece took form as inspiration to make private thoughts 
public. Finally, she thanks the members of this journal for their insightful edits, hard 
work, and decision to publish during a political climate where First Amendment 
jurisprudence is ripe for renegotiation. 
1 See generally Marissa Jackson, Note, Neo-Colonialism, Same Old Racism: A 
Critical Analysis of the United States’ Shift Toward Colorblindness as a Tool for the 
Protection of the American Colonial Empire and White Supremacy, 11 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 156 (2009) (explaining the shift towards colorblindness in the 
American legal and political landscape through a discussion of colonialism).  
2 See OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT 115–16 (2014) (explaining that 
colorblindness is, inter alia, an “acknowledge[ment] that race is a social construction 
without any inherent biological significance. . . . But it uses the constructed nature of 
race to conclude that since race has no biological meaning it therefore has no social 
meaning and therefore should not be recognized at all. Colorblindness encourages a 
disassociation with the social significance of race; it is an affirmative 
nonrecognition of how racial meanings, constructed as they may be, still impact 
social and legal decision making in a manner that fundamentally shapes everyday 
life.”).  
3 See id. at 118–19; see also Jackson, supra note 1, at 175. 
4 See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 145. 
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forms of hate speech5—in a manner that likewise preserves White 
privilege, is less often acknowledged or discussed.6  
For example, many preeminent legal scholars have examined 
the deleterious effect that the Court’s non-regulation of hate speech can 
have on the psyche of minorities;7 however, it is difficult to find 
mainstream liberal scholarship that faults or rebuts the Court’s initial 
presumption against content-based discrimination under the First 
Amendment.8 Deregulation of speech is viewed as a fundamental civil 
liberty in American society, synonymous with “freedom” and 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (finding facially 
unconstitutional per the First Amendment the provision of Virginia’s cross burning 
statute which stated that burning of a cross in public view “shall be prima facie 
evidence of an intent to intimidate[.]”); see also R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 391 (1992) (refusing to uphold the constitutionality of St. Paul ordinance 
prohibiting the display of a symbol which “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” holding it facially invalid 
under the First Amendment). 
6 See, e.g., Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality: Colorblindness, Frederick 
Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823, 849 (2008) 
(“There is a presumption against content-based discrimination under the First 
Amendment. Therefore, the content of messages, whether political speech or racist 
hate speech, must be ignored to protect the free flowing ideological marketplace. 
This fits nicely with the illusion of neutrality—race must be ignored at all costs to 
preserve colorblind neutrality.”). 
7 See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332 (1989) [hereinafter, Matsuda, Considering the 
Victim’s Story] (“In addition to physical violence, there is the violence of the word. 
Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of 
those in the target group.”); see also, MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 7 (1993) [hereinafter, MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND] (“All 
of us found ourselves increasingly drawn into writing, speaking, and engaging in 
public debate as incidents of assaultive speech increased in recent years . . . 
Assaultive speech directly affected our lives and the lives of people from whom we 
cared.”).  
8 See infra note 10; Cf RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING 
WORDS THAT WOUND 204 (2004) (“[A] new form of criticism called First 
Amendment legal realism . . . argues that this noble amendment should be subjected 
to the same degree of legal skepticism and scrutiny as other legal norms.”); Matsuda, 
Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2321 (“In calling for legal sanctions 
for racist speech, this Article rejects an absolutist first amendment position. It calls 
for movement of the societal response to racist speech from the private to the public 
realm.”). 
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“democracy.”9 Thus, the Court, through its fashioning of First 
Amendment hate speech jurisprudence, and its vehement opposition to 
content-based restrictions, has divided scholars into two camps. The 
first camp takes the content-neutral, absolutist (read: colorblind) 
approach that speech should remain unburdened by regulations that 
obstruct the free flow of ideas.10 The second camp, generally comprised 
of critical race theorists,11 posits that the Court should institute greater 
protection for minorities who are more vulnerable to the effects of hate 
speech.12 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) leads the first 
camp in the debate on hate speech,13 and, for progressive legal scholars 
who otherwise agree with the ACLU’s position on most topics, it can 
be a source of great frustration. It can be especially frustrating for legal 
scholars of color who are personally affected by the prevalence of hate 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 264 (1994) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of 
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 884 n.192 (1991)) (“[T]he First Amendment is 
special: The First Amendment, more even than other constitutional provisions 
conferring fundamental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open, 
democratic political regime, at the same time as it secures rights of high importance 
to particular individuals.”). 
10 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 6, at 849 (“There is a presumption against content-
based discrimination under the First Amendment. Therefore, the content of 
messages, whether political speech or racist hate speech, must be ignored to protect 
the free flowing ideological marketplace. This fits nicely with the illusion of 
neutrality—race must be ignored at all costs to preserve colorblind neutrality.”); see 
also Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L REV. 
1639, 1654–57 (1993) (characterizing the First Amendment as “about as close to 
absolute as the Constitution gets” and—in specifically discussing the cross burning 
case, R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) —noting that reading in the 
provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments would be “dangerous business” as 
these amendments are “too tenuous” or “too far” from the First Amendment to be 
factored into an analysis of R.A.V.).  
11 See supra notes 7 and 8. 
12 See DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 8, at 2 (analyzing the legal and historical 
issues that the hate speech debate raises. This includes a strong critique of free 
speech absolutists like the ACLU on the basis that such a position is inherently post-
racial because it presupposes a world without racial stratification).  
13 See Speech on Campus, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (explaining 
why the ACLU defends “unpopular” or “offensive” ideas including hate speech on 
campus that people find bigoted).  
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speech.14 Or worse, scholars of color like myself, who are negatively 
affected by hate speech, can be made to feel feeble-minded for taking 
offense to such speech. This subdual15 is, arguably, a direct result of the 
Court’s colorblind construction of the First Amendment. 
This article critiques the ACLU and the Court’s content-neutral 
position by refusing to choose sides in a debate that is doomed from the 
start.16 Of course, any argument that leads with the proposition that 
there is a First Amendment right not to have one’s feelings hurt, and 
then follows with the assertion that the Court should act to suppress 
speech anytime a minority is offended, will be greeted with great 
skepticism.17 Rather, this article will illustrate how the ACLU’s support 
of the Court’s colorblind approach to analyzing hate speech—and 
specifically, cross burning under the First Amendment—is frustrating 
precisely because it serves as yet another example of the reification of 
White supremacy within constitutional law. 
Using First Amendment cross burning cases as a vehicle, this 
article seeks to expose the Court’s commitment to preserving the status 
quo with respect to racial hierarchy. Part I of this article provides a brief 
primer on First Amendment jurisprudence and how the Court has 
crafted its colorblind, content-neutral contours.18 Parts II and III discuss 
the ways in which the Court and the ACLU maintain White privilege 
when they examine both “fighting words” and “true threats” by looking 
chiefly at what the speaker intends by the speech, and not what a 
                                                 
14 See MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 1 (“This [hate 
speech] debate has deeply divided the liberal civil rights/civil liberties community 
and produced strained relationships within the membership of organizations like the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).”); see also DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra 
note 8, at 32–33.  
15 See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANIC, supra note 8, at 208–09 (discussing arguments 
that emphasize “a certain let-it-roll-off-your-back toughness” with respect to 
regulating hate speech). 
16 See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
17 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”) (citation omitted); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
414 (1992) (White, J., concurring) (“Although the ordinance reaches conduct that is 
unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, 
offense, or resentment, [which] is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
18 See infra Part I. 
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reasonable marginalized listener receiving that speech would consider 
to be fight-inducing, or threatening, respectively.19 Part III additionally 
offers Dr. Chris Demaske’s alternate framework for analyzing hate 
speech that considers the power dynamics at play in First Amendment 
jurisprudence and provides a means of operationalizing the critique 
herein that current First Amendment tests lack an historical lens.20 In 
Part IV, this article addresses how the Court and the ACLU reify White 
supremacy by characterizing hate speech as a form of valuable political 
debate.21 In other words, Part IV examines how the Court’s 
unwillingness to uphold content-based restrictions on conduct like cross 
burning illustrates its belief that cross burnings’ expressive content is 
not worthless or of de minimis value to society, and that it belongs 
within the marketplace of ideas, which is troubling, to say the least.22 
 
I. THE COLORBLIND CONTOURS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE WHITENESS. 
 
Generally speaking, the First Amendment prevents the 
government from regulating speech23 or expressive conduct24 as a 
response to societal disapproval of the ideas expressed. The Court has 
repeatedly held that where the government seeks to restrict speech or 
conduct based on its content, such content-based regulations25 are 
                                                 
19 See infra Parts II, III. 
20 See infra notes 149–59 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra Part IV.  
22 See infra Part IV. 
23 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–11 (1940). 
24 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
25 See Amanda J. Congdon, Comment, Burned Out: The Supreme Court Strikes 
Down Virginia’s Cross Burning Statute in Virginia v. Black, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1049, 1060 (2004) (“A law that restricts speech is content-based if the government 
bases its regulation on the subject matter or viewpoint of the expression. In contrast, 
a law is content-neutral if the government’s justification for the law does not relate 
to the content of the speech.”); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the 
Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 622 (2003) (allocating some of the confusion in First 
Amendment jurisprudence to the definition of “content” and arguing that “the proper 
meaning of ‘content’ is the communicative impact. The appropriate question is . . . 
whether its application depends upon the communicative impact of the speech 
affected. If so, then the action is content-based.”).  
Sidhu  
342  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
presumptively invalid.26 The Court, however, has reasoned that our 
American society, “like other free, but civilized societies,” has carved 
out certain narrow restrictions on the content of speech in certain 
proscribed areas.27 These limited “proscribable”28 categories of content-
based restrictions include speech that is obscene,29 or defamatory.30 The 
Court also permits States to ban a “true threat” without running afoul of 
the First Amendment.31 Perhaps most famously, the Court held in 
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, that States may also restrict 
speech that constitutes “fighting words,” or “those [words] which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace[,]”32 or “those personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common 
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”33 
While the Court has acknowledged that the regulation of all of 
these excepted categories is content-based, the Court has held that the 
First Amendment is inapplicable “because [the categories’] expressive 
content is worthless or of de minimis value to society.”34 Recently, the 
Court further unpacked its rationale behind the regulation of these 
categories under the First Amendment, and limited the government’s 
                                                 
26 For examples of cases where the court determined that content-based regulations 
are presumptively invalid, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).  
27 Id. 
28 See id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court [in R.A.V.] revises this 
categorical approach. It is not, the Court rules, that certain ‘categories’ of expression 
are ‘unprotected,’ but rather that certain ‘elements’ of expression are wholly 
‘proscribable.’ To the Court, an expressive act, like a chemical compound, consists 
of more than one element. Although the act may be regulated because it contains a 
proscribable element, it may not be regulated on the basis of another 
(nonproscribable) element it also contains.”).  
29 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).  
30 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952) (holding racist speech 
that amounts to libel was beyond constitutional protection); see also Roth, 354 U.S 
at 483 (“[L]ibelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech.”). 
31 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, 
R.A.V, 505 U.S at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amendment.”). 
32 Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citation omitted). 
33 Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)). 
34 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 400 (White, J., concurring) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 
571–72). 
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power to legislate therein.35 The Court reasoned that the government 
should be permitted to control their proscribable content insofar as such 
categories act as vehicles for content discrimination, but, the 
government cannot extend the regulation of the category further so that 
“nonproscribable” content is regulated.36 For example, the government 
may pass a law making it illegal to publish libelous content, but cannot 
legislate specifically against libel critical of racial minorities,37 because 
that would indicate the government’s hostility or favoritism towards the 
underlying content of the libel.38  
In other words, First Amendment regulations should be 
“content-neutral,”39 or colorblind, to borrow phrasing from scholars and 
justices describing the Court’s late 20th century approach to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.40 As 
one legal scholar avers, “the content of messages, whether political 
speech or racist hate speech, must be ignored to protect the free flowing 
ideological marketplace.”41 Therefore, this colorblind First Amendment 
framework requires those wishing to proscribe racist speech to show 
that the content may be regulated as part of one of the excepted, content-
based categories, such as fighting words. 
 
                                                 
35 See id. at 383–84 (Scalia, J., majority).   
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 384. But cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952) (Douglass, 
J., dissenting) (“Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which 
was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision, and obloquy. I 
would be willing to concede that [libelous] conduct directed at a race or group in this 
country could be made an indictable offense. For such a project would be more than 
the exercise of free speech. Like picketing, it would be free speech plus.”). 
38 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (“The government may not regulate use based on 
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”). 
39 See Congdon, supra note 25, at 1060 (“A law that restricts speech is content-based 
if the government bases its regulation on the subject matter or viewpoint of the 
expression. In contrast, a law is content-neutral if the government's justification for 
the law does not relate to the content of the speech.”); see also Gielow Jacobs, supra 
note 25, at 622 (allocating some of the confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence 
to the definition of “content” and arguing that “the proper meaning of ‘content’ is the 
communicative impact. The appropriate question is . . . whether its application 
depends upon the communicative impact of the speech affected. If so, then the action 
is content-based.”). 
40 See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 118–29. 
41 Powell, supra note 6, at 849. 
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II. WHITE SUPREMACY AFFIRMED: THE COURT RULES RACIST 
SPEECH IS NOT A FORM OF FIGHTING WORDS. 
 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court defined fighting 
words as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.”42 In addition, for plaintiffs 
arguing that racist hate speech constitutes proscribable fighting words, 
they must show that the speech to be regulated “[is] of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”43 In 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court explained why burning crosses 
privately or publicly cannot be considered fighting words.44 In this case, 
a White individual, known in court documents as R.A.V., burned a cross 
inside the fenced yard of a Black family that lived across the street from 
the house where R.A.V. was staying.45 R.A.V. was prosecuted under the 
St. Paul Bias–Motivated Crime Ordinance,46 which made it a 
misdemeanor to place on public or private property certain symbols or 
objects, including burning crosses, when done with the knowledge that 
such conduct would “arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”47 The Petitioner began 
his oral argument by asking the Court, “[t]o what degree does 
abhorrence of cross burning justify banning it [under the Ordinance]?”48 
The R.A.V. Court, led by Justice Scalia, answered abhorrence alone is 
not sufficient, reasoning, “[a]lthough the [O]rdinance reaches conduct 
that is unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that 
causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, [which] is protected 
                                                 
42 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
43 Id. 
44 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
45 Id. at 379. 
46 ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). 
47 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). 
48 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL 636263, at *3. Petitioner’s oral argument to the 
Court in the R.A.V. case began with the observation that “[e]ach generation must 
reaffirm the guarantee of the First Amendment with the hard cases. The framers 
understood the dangers of orthodoxy and standardized thought and chose liberty. We 
are once again faced with a case that will demonstrate whether or not there is room 
for the freedom for the thought that we hate, whether there is room for the eternal 
vigilance necessary for the opinions that we loathe.” Id. 
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by the First Amendment.”49 Therefore, the Court held, the Ordinance 
was “fatally overbroad and invalid on its face”50 under the First 
Amendment. Scalia’s remarks are consistent with past constitutional 
decisions declaring that Americans cannot invoke the First Amendment 
whenever they are hurt or offended by particular speech or expressive 
conduct.51 
In R.A.V., however, the Minnesota court below determined that 
the Ordinance was not overbroad because it reached only those 
expressions that constitute fighting words within the meaning of 
Chaplinksy.52 Justice Scalia thought differently, stating: 
 
Although the phrase in the [O]rdinance, ‘arouses anger, alarm 
or resentment in others,’ has been limited by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s construction to reach only those symbols or 
displays that amount to ‘fighting words,’ the remaining, 
unmodified terms make clear that the [O]rdinance applies only 
to ‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis 
of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’ Displays containing 
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are 
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified 
disfavored topics. Those who wish to use fighting words in 
connection with other ideas—to express hostility, for example, 
on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or 
homosexuality—are not covered. The First Amendment does 
not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those 
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.53 
 
                                                 
49 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. 
51 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”) (citations omitted); see also, STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1084 (7th ed. 2013) (“[T]erminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)] stands for the 
proposition that speech may not be restricted because the ideas expressed offend the 
audience.”).  
52 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. 
53 Id. at 391 (citations omitted). 
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St. Paul additionally argued that the Ordinance fell within 
another specific exception that allowed content discrimination, that is, 
when it is aimed at the “secondary effects”54 of speech.55 St. Paul 
averred that the Ordinance was intended not to protect the speaker’s 
right to free expression, but instead to protect against the victimization 
of people who have been a part of historically discriminated groups.56 
The Court disposed of this argument by pointing out that two years after 
that “secondary effects” case was decided, the Court clarified in a 
subsequent case that, when considering content-based restriction, 
“secondary effects” cannot include listeners’ reactions or emotive 
impact to speech, because this analysis would cause “damage to free 
and equal debate[.]”57 Moreover, such an addition “could set the Court 
on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First Amendment 
freedoms[,]”58 an argument with which the ACLU concurs. The ACLU, 
joined by other groups in amici for R.A.V., contend that they “do not 
suggest that the reasonable apprehension of fear alone is a sufficient 
predicate for criminal prosecution.”59 As the case deals with 
suppressing speech, the ACLU, et al., “believe that the state must carry 
the additional burden of proving that the speaker intended his statement 
to be taken as a threat, even if he had no intention of actually carrying 
[the threat] out.”60  
The petitioner cross burner in this case, joined by the ACLU,61 
asked the Court to modify the fighting words doctrine to narrow its 
                                                 
54See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 54 (1986) (holding 
that where a city passed an ordinance regulating the time, place, and manner of adult 
movie theatres—finding that its “predominate concerns” were with the “secondary 
effects” of adult theaters on the surrounding community, and not with the content of 
adult films themselves—this finding was more than adequate to establish that the 
city’s zoning interests content-neutral, and unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression).   
55 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 321 (1988)).  
58 Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
59 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 21, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL 
11003956 at * 21 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (Marshall, 
J., concurring)). 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 10–11, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675), 
1991 WL 11003956 at *10–11 (“[A]mici do not believe that this limiting 
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scope, and thereby invalidate the Ordinance as overbroad pursuant to 
this suggested narrower construction.62 However, he argued that even a 
narrower doctrine would be “ineffective because . . . denominating 
particular expression a ‘fighting word’ because of the impact of its 
ideological content upon the audience is inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”63 In fact, even in Chaplinksy, the original fighting words 
case, the state court below declared that in interpreting the fighting 
words statute,64 “[t]he word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of 
what a particular addressee thinks. The test is what men of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an 
average addressee to fight.”65 
St. Paul’s argument regarding the effect on the minority listener 
of hate speech, and the Court’s disposal of it, is especially interesting. 
The Court not only discards the argument using First Amendment 
precedent, which holds that considering how listeners might feel would 
destroy freedom of speech as we know it, but the Court also seems to 
reject the argument on the basis that cross burning does not actually 
                                                 
construction is sufficient to rescue the ordinance from invalidity. . . . Whatever else 
one might say about the Chaplinsky and Brandenburg standards, they have rarely 
been met in the reported cases. By contrast, one need only open the daily paper to 
see how much protected speech has the potential to arouse ‘anger, alarm or 
resentment’ on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”). 
62 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. 
63 Id. at 381 n.3 (“An important component of petitioner’s argument is…that 
narrowly construing the ordinance to cover only ‘fighting words’ cannot cure this 
fundamental defect. In his briefs in this Court, petitioner argued that a narrowing 
construction was ineffective because (1) its boundaries were vague, and because (2) 
denominating particular expression a ‘fighting word’ because of the impact of its 
ideological content upon the audience is inconsistent with the First Amendment . . . 
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner reiterated this second point: ‘It is…one of 
my positions, that in [punishing only some fighting words and not others], even 
though it is a subcategory, technically, of unprotected conduct, [the ordinance] still is 
picking out an opinion, a disfavored message, and making that clear through the 
State.’”) (internal citations omitted).  
64 The Appellant in Chaplinksy was convicted of violating Chapter 378, Section 2 of 
the Public Laws of New Hampshire. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
569 (1942). As cited in Chaplinksy, this law dictates that “[n]o person shall address 
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any 
street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make 
any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or 
annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.” Id. 
65 Id. at 573. 
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have the effect that the listener claims to experience.66 Justice Scalia 
explains that the reason fighting words are categorically excluded from 
First Amendment protection is because the mode of expressing an idea, 
not the idea itself, whatever it might be, is “particularly intolerable (and 
socially unnecessary).”67 But, Scalia writes that St. Paul “has not 
singled out an especially offensive mode of expression—it has not, for 
example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that 
communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) 
manner.”68 This suggests that, to Scalia, cross burning is simply 
“obnoxious,” as opposed to actually threatening, to which countless 
legal scholars, and even Supreme Court Justices—including Clarence 
Thomas—would likely retort, how else should cross burning be 
perceived but threatening?69 Even if the Court refuses to legitimize the 
particular addressee’s level of offense to a burning cross, the likelihood 
that “men of common intelligence”70 would understand that a burning 
cross would not “cause an average addressee to fight”71 is low, given 
that “[t]he world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist organization is . . . 
the Ku Klux Klan [KKK][,]” which often utilizes cross burning as its 
chief instrument of inflicting terror.72  
Therefore, considering the effect of particular hate speech on the 
listener, as opposed to what the speaker intends by the hate speech, is 
absolutely necessary in situations where the Court’s own subjective, 
White-centric, and colorblind notions of what is, and is not threatening 
cloud its judgement with regard to what speech should be afforded First 
Amendment protection. By taking a content-neutral approach that 
                                                 
66 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393; supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
67 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. 
68 Id. 
69 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 391 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In our 
culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably 
instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence.”). 
70 Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 573. 
71 Id. 
72 See Black, 538 U.S. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing M. NEWTON & J. 
NEWTON, THE KU KLUX KLAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA VII (1991)) (“For those not easily 
frightened, cross burning has been followed by more extreme measures, such as 
beatings and murder.”) (citations omitted). Id. at 343–44 (majority opinion) (“The 
Klan has often used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of 
impending violence[.]”) (citations omitted).  
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disregards the listener’s more-than-valid emotive response,73 the Court 
contours the First Amendment in a manner that perpetuates White 
supremacy.  
 
III. FOR TRUE THREATS, THE COURT HOLDS A CROSS BURNER’S 
INTENT IS WORTH MORE THAN THE EFFECT OF 
CROSSBURNING ON MINORITY LISTENERS, THUS UPHOLDING 
WHITE SUPREMACY 
 
The type of intent an individual needs to communicate a “true 
threat” under the First Amendment, i.e., whether the Court should 
consider just the speaker’s intent (subjective approach)74 or 
alternatively, both the effect on the listener of hate speech and the 
speaker’s intent (objective approach)75 is currently the subject of a 
                                                 
73 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 321, 337 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding 
that the content-based nature of a constraint on speech cannot depend on whether the 
restriction is intended to address secondary effects). 
74 Some courts reason that the “clear import” of Black “is that only intentional 
threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First Amendment.” United 
States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005); See, e.g. United States v. 
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the true threat 
requirement is imposed by the Constitution, the subjective test set forth in Black 
must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.”); United States v. 
Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that “an entirely objective 
definition” of true threats may “no longer [be] tenable” after Black); United States v. 
Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360) 
(stating that a constitutionally proscribed true threat “must be made ‘with the intent 
of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’”); White, 670 F.3d at 520 
(Floyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Black…makes purely 
objective approach to ascertain true threat no longer tenable.”).  
75 Other circuits to consider the issue have concluded that “Black did not work a ‘sea 
change,’ tacitly overruling decades of [circuit] case law by importing a requirement 
of subjective intent into all threat-prohibiting statutes.” United States v. Martinez, 
736 F.3d 981, 987–88 (11th Cir. 2013); accord United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 
473, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 59 (2013) (“Black does not 
work the sea change that Jeffries proposes.”); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 
508 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We are not convinced that Black effected the change that 
White claims.”). See also United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(holding, on plain error review, that “this court has applied an objective defendant 
vantage point standard post-Black[,]” and “[a]bsent further clarification from the 
Supreme Court, [they] see no basis to venture further and no basis to depart from 
[their] circuit law.”). 
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circuit split.76 This split follows the Court’s decision in the most recent 
cross burning case, Virginia v. Black.77 In Black, the Court considered 
whether a Virginia statute, which made it a felony to burn a cross on 
private or public property with “the intent of intimidating any person or 
group of persons,”78 violated the First Amendment.79 Of utmost 
importance to the Court,80 the statute also stated, “[a]ny such burning of 
a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person 
or group of persons.”81 Three Virginia residents in this case were 
convicted separately under the statute.82 One White man, ironically 
named Black, led a KKK rally in 1998, in which he burned a cross in an 
open field where other KKK members gathered;83 the other two White 
men drove a truck onto a Black victim’s private property, planted a cross 
on his lawn, and set it on fire.84 The Black individual stated that he was 
“very nervous,” because he “didn't know what would be the next 
phase,” and because “a cross burned in your yard . . . tells you that it’s 
just the first round.”85 The Court itself admitted that “cross burning is 
often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in victims that 
they are a target of violence,”86 and held that Virginia could institute a 
general ban on cross burning with an intent to intimidate given cross 
burnings’ “long and pernicious history as a signal of impending 
violence” in America.87 
Despite the Court’s five-page analysis88 on why cross burning 
in the U.S. is a “symbol of hate,”89 and how it is inextricably linked to 
                                                 
76 United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We are invited in this 
case to change our circuit law on the type of intent needed by a defendant to 
communicate “true threats[.]” We note there is a circuit split on the question of intent 
in the aftermath of Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).”). 
77 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
78 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996). 
79 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
80 Id. at 364 (“The prima facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury 
instruction, renders the statute unconstitutional.”). 
81 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996). 
82 Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 350. 
85 Id. (citations omitted).  
86 Id. at 360. 
87 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
88 Id. at 352–57. 
89 Id. at 357 (citation omitted). 
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the KKK,90 White supremacy, and violence in this nation,91 it 
nonetheless held that the Virginia statute—as written—was 
unconstitutional,92 thereby overturning Black’s conviction,93 and 
vacating the judgment as to the two other cross burners.94 Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the plurality, reasoned that while the First 
Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw content-neutral cross burning 
done with the intent to intimidate (recognizing that such conduct is a 
“particularly virulent form of intimidation”),95 the prima facie provision 
violated the First Amendment because it served as a “shortcut” to 
determining all of the “contextual factors that are necessary to decide 
whether a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate.”96 Citing 
to its own five-page construction of the history of cross burning,97 the 
Court reasoned that a cross burning is not always intended to intimidate, 
“[r]ather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of ideology, a 
symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it 
is used to represent the Klan itself. Thus, it held, burning a cross at a 
political rally would almost certainly be protected expression.”98  
The Supreme Court of Virginia, and the Virginia legislature by 
virtue of writing the prima facie intent clause into the statute, had 
decided that the act of cross burning alone, with no evidence of intent 
to intimidate, would “suffice for arrest and prosecution.”99 But the Court 
felt otherwise, deciding unilaterally that burning a cross could 
symbolize political affiliation,100 comprise part of their ceremonial 
rituals101, and represent general Klan group identity102, the way that hair 
gel unites the cast of Mad Men. This is White supremacy at its finest, in 
that the Court elevates cross burning’s alleged expressive content and 
                                                 
90 Id. at 352. 
91 Id. at 354. 
92 Black, 538 U.S. at 348. 
93 Id. at 367. 
94 Id. at 367–68. 
95 Id. at 363. 
96 Id. at 367. 
97 Black, 538 U.S. at 365. 
98 Id. 365–66 (citations omitted).  
99 Id. at 364. 
100 Id. at 357.  
101 Id. At 356-57.  
102 Id.  
Sidhu  
352  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
reveals its own disregard for the feelings of those experiencing 
threatening hate speech.103  
The true threat definition is undoubtedly murky. The Court 
defines “true threats” as those in which the “speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of 
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”104 
It went on to say that, “[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry 
out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] 
individuals from the fear of violence,”105 and “from the disruption that 
fear engenders,”106 in addition to protecting people “from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur.”107 Thus, from the Court’s stated 
analysis of the true threat exemption from First Amendment protection, 
it is unclear whether true threats must be analyzed from the perspective 
of the speaker, or from the perspective of the person to whom the speech 
is directed.108 It is also unclear whether the speaker must intend simply 
                                                 
103 See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.  
104 Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“political hyperbole” [sic] 
is not a true threat); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).  
105 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See Paul T. Crane, True Threats and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 
1226 (2006) (explaining that “in providing a definition, the Court created more 
confusion than elucidation” and “spawned as many questions as answers.”); see also 
Steven Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation and Free Speech, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2005) (“Justice O’Connor’s opinion in the 
cross burning case borders on the incoherent.”).  
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to communicate, or to subjectively intend to communicate and 
threaten,109 hence the circuit split.110  
What seems clear, however, is that by ruling that a cross burning 
by itself, cannot be understood as a prima facie intent to intimidate, the 
Court has taken an unstated position. That is, the Court endorses the 
view that the speaker’s intent matters more than a reasonable listener, 
or the minority individual’s emotive response, of being “very nervous” 
when seeing a cross burning on his lawn.111 According to this terrorized 
individual’s “common intelligence” to use language from the Court’s 
fighting words doctrine,112 cross burning was just round one of other 
                                                 
109 See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 636–37 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that “while the jury instruction correctly stated that ‘intimidation’ involves ‘words 
and conduct that would put an ordinary, reasonable person in fear or apprehension,’ 
it failed to specify that the statute requires ‘fear or apprehension’ of injury inflicted 
by the defendant. Whether the threat is of injury to person or property, there is no 
doubt that it must be a threat of injury brought about—rather than merely 
predicted—by the defendant.”); accord United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 
1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that a constitutionally proscribed true threat “must be 
made ‘with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.’” 
(quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003))). Cf. United States v. 
Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding, on plain error review, that “this 
court has applied an objective defendant vantage point standard post-Black[,]” and 
“[a]bsent further clarification from the Supreme Court, [they] see no basis to venture 
further and no basis to depart from [their] circuit law.”). 
110Compare United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) and rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (citing 
Black, 538 U.S. at 359) (“[W]e read ‘statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence’ to mean that the speaker must intend to make the communication. It would 
require adding language the Court did not write to read the passage as ‘statements 
where the speaker means to communicate [and intends the statement to be 
understood as] a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence.’ This is not what the Court wrote, and it is inconsistent with the logic 
animating the true threats exception.”) (internal citation omitted) with Cassel, 408 
F.3d at 631 (“The clear import of [the ‘true threats’ definition in Virginia v. Black] is 
that only intentional threats are criminally punishable consistently with the First 
Amendment. First, the definition requires that ‘the speaker means to 
communicate…an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.’ A natural reading 
of this language embraces not only the requirement that the communication itself be 
intentional, but also the requirement that the speaker intend for his language to 
threaten the victim.”). 
111 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
112 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
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progressively worse phases of threats and violence.113 The Court’s 
minimization of the threatening effect of cross burning on minority 
individuals in this nation, as seen in Black, is nevertheless consistent 
with the aforementioned discussion of Justice Scalia’s analysis in 
R.A.V., that cross burning is more “obnoxious” than actually threatening 
fighting words.114 These two cross burning cases demonstrate that the 
Court’s First Amendment analysis will disregard history and context 
and adopt a White-centric framework through which to evaluate threat 
levels. And that White individuals’ right to express themselves through 
a discriminatory act foretelling racial violence is valued equally if not 
greater than the Black person’s reactive fear of that impending 
violence.115 Herein lies the reification of White supremacy through the 
Court’s construction of First Amendment law. 
The ACLU certainly takes the position that Black compels the 
consideration of the speaker’s “subjective intent to threaten”116 in any 
true threat analysis.117 According to the ACLU, “one person’s 
opprobrium may be another’s threat,” therefore, “[a] statute that 
proscribes speech without regard to the speaker’s intended meaning 
                                                 
113 Black, 538 U.S. at 363. 
114 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (“[I]t has not, for 
example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas 
in a threatening (as opposed to merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed 
fighting words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or 
religious intolerance.”). 
115 See Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“That cross burning subjects 
its targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience, to extreme emotional distress, 
and is virtually never viewed merely as ‘unwanted communication,’ but rather, as a 
physical threat, is of no concern to the plurality. Henceforth, under the plurality’s 
view, physical safety will be valued less than the right to be free from unwanted 
communications.”) (internal citations omitted). 
116 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (No. 90-7675), 1991 WL 
11003956 at *6 (“Establishing subjective intent to threaten as a constitutional mens 
rea requirement for true threats would not require any deviation from this Court’s 
precedents.”); see also Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) 
(No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752 at *6 (“Although lower courts have divided over 
how to interpret Black, this Court’s plain language and reasoning strongly support 
the conclusion that Black defined true threats to include only those statements made 
with the intent to threaten.”). 
117 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, Elonis, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-
983).  
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runs the risk of punishing protected First Amendment expression simply 
because it is crudely or zealously expressed.”118 As a result, the ACLU 
argues that the Court’s plain language and reasoning in Black supports 
the view that true threats should include only those statements made 
with the intent to threaten,119 in order to “ensure adequate breathing 
room for such [core political, artistic, and ideological speech.]”120  
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, mandates an “objective 
test,” which considers whether the speaker knowingly intended to 
communicate, and whether an objective or reasonable person would 
regard it as a serious expression of harm, thereby rendering irrelevant 
the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten.121 Likewise, the Third Circuit 
has determined that reading the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten 
into Black contravenes the logic undergirding the true threats exception, 
as it “would fail to protect individuals from ‘the fear of violence’ and 
the ‘disruption that fear engenders,’ because it would protect speech that 
a reasonable speaker would understand to be threatening.”122  
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly maintained that its 
objective test in determining whether a statement constitutes a true 
threat is if “an ordinary reasonable recipient who is familiar with the 
context . . . would interpret [the statement] as a threat of injury.”123 
                                                 
118 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 
WL 4215752 at *5. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.   
121 Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“However, the government can proscribe a true threat of violence without offending 
the First Amendment. Speech is a ‘true threat’ and therefore unprotected if an 
objectively reasonable person would interpret the speech as a ‘serious expression of 
an intent to cause a present or future harm.’ The protected status of the threatening 
speech is not determined by whether the speaker had the subjective intent to carry 
out the threat; rather, to lose the protection of the First Amendment and be lawfully 
punished, the threat must be intentionally or knowingly communicated to either the 
object of the threat or a third person. Importantly, whether a speaker intended to 
communicate a potential threat is a threshold issue, and a finding of no intent to 
communicate obviates the need to assess whether the speech constitutes a ‘true 
threat.’”). 
122 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329–30 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
123 United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). See 
also Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (citing United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 
1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973)) (“The reasonable listener test, the second version of the 
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Some courts have called the “reasonable listener standard” a strict 
liability standard, that allows a jury to convict speakers for making 
ambiguous statements that the listener might find threatening, 
regardless of whether the speaker knew the listener would find it 
threatening.124 But, the Fourth Circuit, in adopting a standard that takes 
into account what the reasonable listener perceives, knowing the context 
of the speaker’s threats—as opposed to what the reasonable cross burner 
intends—removes the element of White privilege that is inherent in the 
Court and the ACLU’s reliance on the speaker’s intent in cross 
burning.125 Undoubtedly, with regard to cross burning, “I’m sorry you 
feel that way” is hardly an appropriate or logical response by the 
speaker, given the history of racism and terror associated with such 
conduct; only the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ articulation of the 
true threat test, which take listener’s experiences into account, can 
provide adequate protection for minority groups victimized by hate 
speech and the hate crimes which oftentimes follow.126 
Moreover, focusing on what the speaker intends by the speech 
versus what the reasonable listener perceives, maintains White 
supremacy in First Amendment jurisprudence, because it ignores the 
reality that an act of terrorism against minorities in America does not 
need to be blatantly hateful for it to be understood as a true threat, or a 
fighting word.127 The speaker’s intent does not need to be made crystal 
clear by the speaker, because White supremacist groups leverage 
hundreds of years’ worth of history and state-sanctioned racism when 
                                                 
objective test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true threat if ‘an 
ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [statement] 
would interpret it as a threat of injury.’”). 
124 See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Where a 
statement may be ambiguous, the entire context, including the tone used, may assist 
the jury in determining whether that ambiguous statement was a threat.”); see also 
Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (“In reasonable listener jurisdictions, the only intent 
element is that the statement was knowingly made.”). 
125 See Crane, supra note 108, at 1246 (“The reasonable listener test, the second 
version of the objective test, takes a different perspective: a communication is a true 
threat if ‘an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the 
[statement].’”). 
126 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343–44 (2003) (explaining that “The Klan 
has often used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending 
violence[.] . . . For those not easily frightened, cross burning has been followed by 
more extreme measures, such as beatings and murder.”) (citations omitted). 
127 See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text. 
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they threaten racial minorities.128 In Black, Justice Thomas forcefully 
begins his dissent by asserting, “[i]n every culture, certain things 
acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend. That 
goes for both the sacred…and the profane. I believe that cross burning 
is the paradigmatic example of the latter.”129 Alexander Tsesis, who has 
written extensively on how hate speech can catalyze crimes against 
humanity130 maintains, “[s]tatements against out-groups can reflect the 
speakers’ willingness to act in accordance to prejudice, [clear examples 
including] the connection between historical symbols like burning 
crosses and swastikas with menacing behavior.”131 Yet, in an 
Establishment Clause case, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. 
Pinette, the Court ruled that the KKK cross was simply a religious 
symbol, thereby overturning the lower court’s decision to deny the 
KKK its permit to place a cross in the state-house plaza (a public forum) 
during the Christmas season.132 Justice Scalia writing for the majority, 
therefore, ruled in favor of the KKK’s right to erect a cross, holding that 
the KKK’s cross was private religious Christian speech, which is as 
fully protected under the free speech clause of the First Amendment as 
secular private expression.133 Though Justice Thomas concurred with 
the result, he wrote separately to vehemently oppose the Court’s initial 
presumption that the KKK’s cross is a symbol of Christianity.134 He 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 388–89 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In holding [the ban 
on cross burning with intent to intimidate] unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice 
Holmes’ familiar aphorism that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ The 
world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist organization is not European or even Middle 
Eastern in origin. Fifty years before the Irish Republican Army was organized, a 
century before Al Fatah declared its holy war on Israel, the Ku Klux Klan was 
actively harassing, torturing, and murdering in the United States. Today its members 
remain fanatically committed to a course of violent opposition to social progress and 
racial equality in the United States.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
129 Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
130 ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE 
WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS chs. 2–4 (2002); Alexander 
Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: An 
Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 
740–55 (2000); Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO 
L. REV. 141, 142 (2005). 
131Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141, 
143 (2005). 
132 Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760–61 (1995). 
133 Id. at 760–61.  
134 Id. at 770–72. 
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argues that the KKK’s cross is a “symbol of hate,” and “a symbol of 
[W]hite supremacy” as opposed to a symbol of religious worship.135 As 
Thomas avers in Black, “the connection between cross burning and 
violence is well ingrained[.]”136 In fact, he refers to “violent and 
terroristic conduct” as “the Siamese twin of cross burning[.]”137 Thomas 
goes on to cite lower court opinions wherein courts recognize that, for 
minority individuals, fearing for their own lives and the lives of their 
loved ones is a reasonable reaction to seeing a burning cross based on 
historical events.138 For example, in one cited case, a woman testified 
that as a Black American specifically, the burning cross symbolized 
“[n]othing good. Murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just anything bad 
that you can name.”139  
Moreover, implicit acts of racism deserve attention even if legal 
institutions are unwilling to recognize them as such. One of the 
resounding critiques of the seminal Equal Protection Clause case, 
Washington v. Davis, wherein the Supreme Court held that a facially 
neutral law with even a profound racially discriminatory impact was not 
a per se violation of the Equal Protection clause without proof of 
discriminatory intent, is that it requires minority plaintiffs to produce a 
“smoking gun” to prove claims of racism.140  Indeed, much of implicit 
bias discourse and movement-building is focused on pushing the law to 
recognize implicit bias and implicit racism, precisely because of the 
standard set in Washington v. Davis and its progeny.141 But, as scholars 
                                                 
135 Id.  
136 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 390 (2003) (emphasis added). 
137 Id. at 394.  
138 Id. at 390–91. 
139 Id. at 390–93. 
140 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245–48 (1976); See also Jonathan Feingold 
& Kren Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 210.221 
(citing to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) to introduce current disparate 
treatment theory, then noting that current efforts by plaintiffs trying to make a 
credible racism allegation requires that they find evidence of the defendant’s 
conscious intent to discriminate. “[T]hose alleging racism…search for the smoking-
gun quote or document that will reveal racist intent.”).   
141 See, e.g., Intent Standard, Equal Justice Society, 
https://equaljusticesociety.org/law/intentdoctrine/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) 
(“Existing equal protection law fails to incorporate many modern-day manifestations 
of discrimination and therefore deprives potential plaintiffs of access to our courts 
and redress for discrimination. Moreover, conservatives have worked to entrench the 
“intent” approach and push us down a path towards colorblind Constitutionalism. 
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maintain, “[a] ‘smoking gun’ is rarely found because naked prejudice is 
kept safely hidden.”142 Instead, most racism “often reflect[s] our 
familiarity with explicit biases,” and only hints at race.143 However, 
racial animus is not a thing of the past, simply because racial epithets 
have become more nuanced and less overt. Instead, we must use 
historically-based context clues to gap-fill: the KKK no longer needs to 
accompany its crosses with placards espousing racist vitriol, the cross 
speaks for itself and relies on our familiarity with history and on explicit 
biases to make its point. But, the Court—in a display of severe historical 
amnesia—instead holds that the KKK’s cross is a symbol of its 
celebration of Christianity.144 An analogously unsound ruling would be 
if the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany’s highest court) 
were to adjudicate an issue today involving a neo-Nazi group’s right to 
erect a swastika, by premising a favorable opinion to the neo-Nazi group 
on the basis that the swastika represents to that group an ancient 
religious icon used in the Indian subcontinent. Such a statement is 
illogical precisely because it ignores any and all historical context. 
The emotive response of fear instilled in individual minorities 
who are victimized by White supremacist rhetoric, and their “common 
intelligence” about what a burning cross signifies, is informed not just 
by any individualized instance of terror, but rather, by the codification 
of pages of history that makes up America’s past of slavery, racial 
segregation and state-sanctioned discrimination.145 The Court, in 
allowing such conduct to receive First Amendment protection, 
contributes to a re-writing of history so as to ignore the real experiences 
of terror experienced by minorities. Thus, for the Court to adequately 
protect minorities, it is crucial that First Amendment jurisprudence 
                                                 
To address this problem, [Equal Justice Society] has successfully facilitated the 
incorporation of the cognitive science theory of ‘implicit bias’ (also known as 
‘unconscious bias’) into both litigation and public policy discourse surrounding 
discrimination law.”). 
142 Gabriel “Jack” Chin et al., Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward 
a Community of Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 Asian Pac. Am. 
L.J. 129, 133 (1996). 
143 Feingold & Lorang, supra note 140, at 221 
144 Black, 538 U.S. at 356–57. 
145 See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 388 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In holding the ban on cross burning with intent to 
intimidate unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes’ familiar aphorism that 
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”) (internal punctuation and citations 
omitted). 
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understand true threats and fighting words from the perspective of 
“reasonable listeners146,” instead of following the ACLU’s guidance, 
which urges courts to consider what the speaker intends to communicate 
and, in so doing, unjustifiably affords White supremacists the benefit of 
the doubt. 
Dr. Chris Demaske, who interrogates issues of power associated 
with the First Amendment and culturally disempowered groups, 
proposes a three-prong doctrinal framework to analyze First 
Amendment cases to allow for an analysis of the “historical relationship 
between group identity and individual power . . . and the power 
embedded between individual speakers.”147 In Demaske’s framework 
 
[i]n place of the traditional focus on whether the regulation in 
question is content-neutral or content-based, [the Court would 
consider:] (1) the character, nature and scope of the speech 
restriction; (2) the historical context of the cultural groups involved 
in the speech at issue; and (3) the individual power relations 
occurring at the particular speech moment.148  
 
The first prong allows the Court to holistically consider the 
government’s reason for censorship or restriction that could allow for 
content and viewpoint restrictions, but still recognizes that the character 
of the speech—whether content-based or content-neutral—is a 
significant consideration.149 Under the second prong, “the Court would 
consider the historic context based on culturally constructed group 
identity when reviewing whether to restrict speech,” with empirical 
psychological and social scientific studies to be “used to determine the 
status [and level]150 of a group’s historical disempowerment.”151 
                                                 
146 See e.g., Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2357 (“The 
alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different because of its 
content is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions, such as the 
“fighting words” doctrine...”). 
147 Chris Demaske, Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate 
Speech, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 280 (2004). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 280–81. 
150 ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE 
WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS chs. 2–4 (2002) (outlining “ways in which 
historical data could be used to determine the level of disempowerment individuals 
may feel based on their group identity.”). 
151 See Demaske, supra note 147, at 281–82. 
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Moreover, Demaske notes that incorporating this prong is consistent 
with the majority’s extensive analysis of the history of cross-burning in 
Black as a symbol of hate.152 The third prong looks at relational power 
dynamics, and “requires a consideration of the power dynamic of the 
specific speech situation. For example, does the speech take place on 
public or private property? Are the speakers alone or surrounded by 
others?”153 A “speech moment” analysis could also take into account, 
for instance, whether the public space in which the speech occurs takes 
place in a town comprised of a community that is predominantly made 
up of the ethnically marginalized, or otherwise marginalized group who 
is the target of that speech.154 Demaske’s alternative framework, 
therefore, offers a method of exorcising White supremacy from the First 
Amendment by allowing state governments to use “historical evidence 
and psychological studies to create effective hate-speech regulations 
that would not unfairly privilege one side of the debate or drive certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”155 
 
IV. THE COURT LEGITIMATES WHITE SUPREMACY BY 
LEGITIMATING HATE SPEECH. 
 
The Court additionally maintains White supremacy by elevating 
cross burning to important racist expression, necessary to political 
debate seen vis-à-vis its decision to analyze conduct like cross burning 
under the First Amendment; and to then afford such conduct First 
Amendment protection.  
In Justice Thomas’s powerful dissent in Black, he argues that 
cross burning is terrorizing conduct, rather than racist expression, and 
therefore does not need to be analyzed under the First Amendment 
whatsoever.156 Thomas maintains that his conclusion is supported by 
the fact that the Virginia legislature sought to enact a statute that 
acknowledged and rectified the State’s own prevailing practice of racial 
segregation.157 Moreover, Thomas posits that Virginia, in instituting a 
ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate demonstrates: 
 
                                                 
152 Id. at 281–82. 
153 Id. at 282. 
154 Id. at 282–83, 296. 
155 Id. at 316.  
156 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 394–95 (2003). 
157 Id.  
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[E]ven segregationists understood the difference between 
intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression. It is 
simply beyond belief that, in passing the statute now under 
review, the Virginia Legislature was concerned with anything 
but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particularly 
vicious. Accordingly, this statute prohibits only conduct, not 
expression. And, just as one cannot burn down someone’s house 
to make a political point and then seek refuge in the First 
Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and intimidate to 
make their point. In light of my conclusion that the statute here 
addresses only conduct, there is no need to analyze it under any 
of our First Amendment tests.158 
 
The Court, however, is resolved on ensuring that cross 
burning—despite its notoriety as an instrument of terror—receives the 
benefit of First Amendment protection because of its apparent 
expressive value.159 The Court’s holding in Black is demonstrative of 
this point.160  
The Court, of course, has used law to suppress the flourishing 
of certain ideas through content-based restrictions, even in the face of 
First Amendment-based counter-arguments in the past.161 So-called 
“low value” speech includes fighting words, commercial advertising;162 
                                                 
158 Id. at 394–95. 
159 Id. at 366 (“[O]ccasionally a person who burns a cross does not intend to express 
either a statement of ideology or intimidation. Cross burnings have appeared in 
movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays such as the stage adaptation of Sir 
Walter Scott’s The Lady of the Lake.”). 
160 Id. at 366 (“Burning a cross at a political rally would almost certainly be 
protected expression.”) (citations omitted). 
161 See generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 2166, 2228 (2015) (noting that it is widely accepted that the First 
Amendment is inapplicable, or applies weakly to “low-value” speech, but 
challenging the assumption that such low-value speech has never raised any 
constitution concern).  
162 See id. at 2182. (“Advertising has been considered a category of low-value speech 
since the Court rather summarily held, in Valentine v. Chrestensen in 1942, that the 
Constitution’s protections did not apply to this kind of speech.”). 
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defamation;163 and obscene, or profane speech.164 For various reasons, 
the Court has deemed this speech so valueless that it is simply unworthy 
of Constitutional protection.165 For instance, in New York v. Ferber, the 
Court held, inter alia, that two movies depicting young boys 
masturbating was unprotected by the First Amendment, because the 
value of permitting the live permanence “of children engaged in lewd 
sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”166 The Court 
considers political speech, on the other hand, to be of “high value.”167 
However, it is likewise a myth that the Court has never allowed states 
to proscribe content-based, political speech. In Gitlow v. People of State 
of New York, the Court upheld a New York law that rendered criminal 
anarchy a felony, and sustained the conviction of a man who published 
and circulated a “Left Wing Manifesto” denouncing capitalism and 
supporting communism.168 The Court based its decision on the theory 
that a State has the right to self-preservation,169 and that free speech 
guarantees may be reasonably limited, for example, by a State that, “in 
the exercise of its police power . . . punish[es] those who abuse this 
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt 
public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace.”170  
That the Court determined the Virginia cross burning statute to 
be unconstitutional on the basis that it would create the “unacceptable 
risk of the suppression of ideas,”171 thereby illustrates the Court’s 
backing of White supremacy as an “idea,” worthy of Constitutional 
protection, or at least, that it serves higher than de minimis value to 
society. The Black plurality reiterated the bedrock principle embedded 
                                                 
163 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256 (1952); see also Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (“[L]ibelous utterances are not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech.”). 
164 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (“[E]xpressions found in numerous opinions indicate 
that this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of 
speech and press.”). 
165 Lakier, supra note 161, at 2228. 
166 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982). 
167 See Lakier, supra note 161, at 2228. 
168 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 656 n.2 (1925) (“The world is in crisis. 
Capitalism, the prevailing system of society, is in process of disintegration and 
collapse. Humanity can be saved from its last excesses only by the Communist 
Revolution.”). 
169 Id. at 668.  
170 Id. at 667 (citations omitted).  
171 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).  
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in our First Amendment jurisprudence, that the “hallmark of the 
protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas 
that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or 
discomforting.”172 Putting aside the vast evidence that cross burning 
instills in minorities a little more than discomfort, the Court’s assertion 
here—in the context of cross burning—substantiates racial hatred as 
valuable political discourse to society; a minority individual’s identity 
in this country is a topic always up for discussion. This principal is 
enshrined in other, non-cross burning-related First Amendment cases as 
well.173  
 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, at issue was Ohio’s “Criminal 
Syndicalism Act,” which punished those who, generally speaking, 
advocated violence as a means of accomplishing political reform.174 
Ohio had used the Act to convict the leader of a KKK group, who at a 
KKK rally, had shown a video to KKK members.175 Portions of the film 
were also later broadcast on local television and on a national 
network.176 The film contained derogatory phrases about Black and 
Jewish people, stating “[t]his is what we are going to do to the niggers[,] 
                                                 
172 Id. at 358 (citation omitted); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 
4 (1949) (“Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is 
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at 
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for 
acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to 
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”) (internal citation omitted). 
173 See Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2351 (“What the 
American position means in the area of race is that expressions of the ideas of racial 
inferiority or racial hatred are protected. Anyone who wants to say that African 
Americans and Jews are inferior and deserving of persecution is entitled to. However 
loathsome this idea may be, it is still political speech.”). 
174 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2923.13) (“The Act punishes persons who ‘advocate or teach the duty, 
necessity, or propriety’ of violence ‘as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform;’ or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing 
such advocacy; or who ‘justify’ the commission of violent acts ‘with intent to 
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; 
or who ‘voluntarily assemble’ with a group formed ‘to teach or advocate the 
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’”). 
175 Id. at 444. 
176 Id. at 445. 
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[a] dirty nigger[,] send the Jews back to Israel . . . [s]ave America. Let’s 
go back to constitutional betterment. Bury the nigger.”177 In a per 
curium opinion, the Court determined the Act was unconstitutional 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it punished mere 
advocacy and assembly, as opposed to punishing incitement to 
imminent lawless action, which would be constitutional.178 Moreover, 
the Court reasoned that failing to distinguish between advocacy and 
imminent lawless action “sweeps within its condemnation speech which 
our Constitution has immunized from governmental control.”179 The 
Court did not elaborate on what speech would fit into this category of 
“immunized” speech,180 however, a direct comparison of the previously 
discussed Gitlow case181 with Brandenberg yields the conclusion that 
the type of political speech in Brandenberg, i.e., hate speech, has more 
than minimal value to the Court. What value such hate speech has is 
beyond comprehension to many academics,182 but is certainly consistent 
with the theory that the Court uses constitutional law to preserve ideas 
of White supremacy, insofar as “being a member of a privileged group 
is being the . . . subject of all inquiry in which people of color or other 
non-privileged groups are the objects.”183 
The Court’s commitment to preserving White supremacist 
ideological values through its protection of so-determined, “high value” 
hate speech is further supported by the Court’s analysis in the more 
recent cross burning cases discussed herein.184 In R.A.V., for example, 
Justice Scalia wrote that the Ordinance at issue which proscribed 
‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender, “[went] even beyond mere content 
                                                 
177 Id. at 446 n.1 (internal punctuation omitted). 
178 Id. at 457. 
179 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
180 See Demaske, supra note 147, at 174 (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449) 
(“Any statute or law that would restrict speech not producing ‘imminent lawless 
action’ would ‘sweep within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has 
immunized from government control.’ The Court did not set any additional 
parameters of what speech would fit into this category.”).  
181 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.  
182 See generally MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7. 
183 Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The 
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other - Isms), 
1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 402 (1991). 
184 Supra Parts II and III.  
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discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination,”185 the logic being 
that proponents of racial equality could argue their points, but White 
supremacists would be crippled.186 Scalia contended that “St. Paul has 
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”187 
Similarly, the Court, in Black, reasoned that the unconstitutional prima 
facie evidence provision of the Virginia statute at issue, denied the 
defendants the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to put 
on a defense.188 Therefore, Scalia, in R.A.V., and O’Connor in Black 
expressly reaffirm White supremacy by treating it as one side of a 
“debate,” which merits airtime. Justice White, in dissent, takes issue 
with Scalia’s position, and avers that, “by characterizing fighting words 
as a form of ‘debate,’ the majority legitimates hate speech as a form of 
public discussion.”189 White additionally observes: 
 
Any contribution of [R.A.V.’s] holding to First Amendment 
jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily 
signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of 
intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on 
someone’s lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social 
interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such 
fighting words outside the First Amendment.190 
 
Justice White, in one sentence, presents the theory that the Court 
intends to keep messages of racial hatred within the reach of the First 
Amendment, because the value of their content outweighs the public 
interest in order and morality. The Court values racial hatred so much, 
that Americans should be able to trade ideas freely about whether the 
                                                 
185 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).  
186 See id. (“Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for example—
would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting words’ that do not 
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a person's 
mother, for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those 
arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by 
those speakers’ opponents.”). 
187 Id. at 392. 
188 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 345 (2003). 
189 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
190 Id.  
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White race is supreme, with First Amendment protection, and without 
undue interference from federal or state authorities.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court and the ACLU sincerely believe that their 
content-neutral, colorblind, and laissez-faire approach to the regulation 
of hate speech under the First Amendment protects the free-flow of 
ideas. This article has challenged this popular viewpoint by first 
exposing the lack of First Amendment absolutism,191 and second, by 
presenting the distinct ways in which the Court, through its cross 
burning cases, has deliberately shaped the contours of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in a manner that maintains White supremacy.192 The 
Court does this by insisting that cross burning has redeeming political 
value by refusing to recognize it as non-speech fighting words; and by 
defining true threats by the speaker’s intent rather than what a 
reasonable minority individual would understand to be threatening.193 
Finally, the Court legitimates White supremacy by even choosing to 
afford cross burning First Amendment protection. That is, the Court 
could instead create a rule that cross burning encourages a debate about 
whether a minority has the right to exist, and, that such a debate is 
actually low value speech, undeserving of any First Amendment 
analysis.194  
Although the ACLU’s abstract argument that only the broadest 
content-neutral protection of speech will provide the best hope for 
eliminating racial hatred may be compelling, in reality, it is a post-racial 
position that ignores and forgets our nation’s gruesome history of 
slavery and state-sanctioned segregation. Former ACLU president Ira 
Glasser believed that the problem is not speech, but bigotry and 
prejudice, and only a liberal construction of the First Amendment will 
necessarily allow for the type of discourse that will combat 
                                                 
191 See supra Part II. 
192 See supra Part III.  
193 See supra Part III; see also Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 
7, at 2357 (“The alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different 
because of its content is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions, 
such as the “fighting words” doctrine and the “content/conduct” distinction.”). 
194 See supra Part IV. 
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discrimination.195 However, to make sense of the ACLU’s logic, an 
ahistorical understanding of cross burning is required. As Professor 
Obasogie writes, the “role of context and history in colorblindness 
discourses is largely sidestepped and undertheorized in favor of flat, 
acontextual claims that race consciousness is race consciousness is race 
consciousness; the Klansman and the affirmative action supporter suffer 
from the same folly of paying too much attention to race.”196 Of course, 
this ideological stance, “denies the ongoing significance of racial 
subordination and White racial privilege.”197 Indeed, so too does the 
Court and ACLU’s colorblind position that all ideas, including notions 
of White supremacy, are of equal value to society.198  
Cross burning is valueless, like other threats and words that by 
their very utterance inflict injury; for the Court and the ACLU to find 
otherwise maintains a system of law that places White privilege above 
the security and dignity of minorities.199 The danger of forgetting and 
unknowing the historical context of cross burning,200 and allowing such 
terrorism to thrive as a protected form of expression, is that minority 
victims’ right to protection from White terrorism is undermined. If we 
                                                 
195 See generally Ira Glasser, Introduction to HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. ET AL., 
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES (1995) (arguing that dialogue, not censorship, might better lead us to 
racial justice). 
196 See OBASOGIE, supra note 2, at 172. 
197 Id. 
198 See Powell, supra note 6, at 849 (“Content neutrality and colorblindness are 
reinforcing doctrinal concepts. Both types of ‘blindness’ (to content under the First 
Amendment) and to race (under the Fourteenth Amendment) lead to the same result. 
The First Amendment’s prohibition against content-based discrimination by the 
state, as applied to hate speech and colorblind constitutionalism both serve to 
preserve the status quo.”).  
199 See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 8 (arguing that hate speech left 
unregulated harms both society and the individuals who are targeted by the speech 
precisely because it devalues targeted individuals and promotes their unequal 
treatment); Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2378 (“[T]he 
failure to provide a legal response limiting hate propaganda elevates liberty interests 
of racists over liberty interests of targets.”). 
200 See Matsuda, Considering the Victim’s Story, supra note 7, at 2368 (calling 
generally for an end to “unknowing” our history of racism, and that, “[r]ather than 
looking to the neutral, objective, unknowing, and ahistorical reasonable person, we 
should look to the victim-group members to tell us whether the harm is real harm to 
real people.”). 
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are to take the goals of the Reconstruction Amendments201 seriously,202 
such an ahistorical, colorblind view of the First Amendment cannot and 
should not persist.  
 
 
                                                 
201 See Scott Allen Carlson, The Gerrymandering of the Reconstruction Amendments 
and Strict Scrutiny: The Supreme Court’s Unwarranted Intrusion into the Political 
Thicket, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 71, 77 (1997) (“Prior to the passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment was promulgated by the Thirty-
Ninth Congress in 1868 with the purpose of securing racial equalization and 
eliminating racially discriminatory practices.”). 
202 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992) (criticizing the R.A.V. Court for 
“seem[ing] to have forgotten that it is a Constitution they are expounding, and that 
the Constitution contains not just the First Amendment, but the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments as well.”).  
